Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies by Billand, Pascal et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Networks of Collaboration in
Multi-market Oligopolies
Pascal Billand and Christophe Bravard and Subhadip
Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi
GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de The´orie e´conomique), Lyon and St.
Etienne, University of St. Etienne, France, Queen’s University
Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, United Kingdom,
Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, U.S.A.
1. November 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28188/
MPRA Paper No. 28188, posted 18. January 2011 20:17 UTC
Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market
Oligopolies∗
Pascal Billand†, Christophe Bravard‡, Subhadip Chakrabarti§and
Sudipta Sarangi¶
1 November, 2010
Abstract
The result that firms competing in a Cournot oligopoly with pairwise collab-
oration form a complete network under zero or negligible link formation costs
provided by Goyal and Joshi (2003) no longer hold in multi-market oligopolies.
Link formation in one market aﬀects a firm’s profitability in another market in
a possibly negative way resulting in the fact that it is no longer always prof-
itable in an unambiguous manner. With non-negative link formation costs, the
stable networks have a dominant group architecture and eﬃcient networks are
charecterized by at most one non-singleton component with a geodesic distance
between players that is less than three.
Key words: networks, collaboration, R & D
JEL code: C70, L13, L20, D85
∗Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi thank CREUSET Saint-Etienne (currently GATE
Lyon Sant-Etienne), Université Jean Monnet for generous research and travel grants that made this
paper possible. Pascal Billand thanks the participants of “Collaborative Networks for a Sustainable
World: 11th IFIP WG 5.5 Working Conference on Virtual Enterprises, PRO-VE 2010, St. Etienne,
France, October 11-13, 2010” for helpful comments and suggestions. An abridged version of this
paper is available in the proceedings of this conference (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-15961-9 ).
†GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, France
‡GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, France
§Queen’s University Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland, United
Kingdom
¶Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA
1
1 Introduction
In two landmark papers, Goyal and Joshi (2003, 2006) set forth the issue of using the
emerging network formation literature to discuss collaboration in R&D among a set
of oligopolistic firms. The first paper characterizes stable and eﬃcient networks. The
second paper show that the model is an example of a more general category of models
called playing the field games. In this paper, we extend the analysis to oligopolistic
firms competing in more than one market.
Goyal and Joshi (2003) put forward the proposition that firms competing in a
homogeneous Cournot oligopoly with constant returns to scale cost functions and
forming collaborative links among themselves will form a complete network under
negligible link formation costs. The rationale is straightforward. Links lower marginal
costs of both players involved in forming a link. The firm gains in terms of gross profits
(or profits not including link formation costs) by the lowering of its marginal cost.
It loses by the lowering of its partner’s marginal costs. The gain outweighs the loss
and hence link formation is profitable. Similar results will follow if link formation
increases demand (for instance, by increasing the demand intercept) of both firms
forming a collaborative link. Such increases may be the outcome of quality enhancing
collaborations.
Now, consider the case where firms compete in more than one market. Then, the
mechanics of the eﬀects associated with link formation are much more complicated.
Bulow et al. (1985) investigate some of these eﬀects in a general strategic setting.
Suppose there are joint diseconomies across markets in the sense that higher quan-
tity produced in one market reduces marginal profitability associated with an unit
of production in the other. Furthermore, the market structure is such that goods
produced by competing firms are strategic substitutes. Then any strategic action
(such as collaborative link formation) designed to increase demand and reduce costs
inevitably increases the quantity produced in one market. This will (because of joint
diseconomies) reduce the marginal profitability and quantity produced in the other
market. Because of strategic substitutability, rival firms increase quantities produced
and this induces certainly a loss in the second market and possibly an overall loss for
the firm.
We investigate the stable and eﬃcient networks that may form in the setting of
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a multi-market oligopoly with non-negative link formation costs. We assume a het-
erogeneous product market, linear demand curves and quadratic cost functions. In a
departure from Goyal and Joshi (2003), we look at quality-enchancing collaborations
rather than cost-reducing collaborations. Since multiple quality levels are incompati-
ble with the notion of a homogeneous product, we look at a market with diﬀerentiated
products. The quadratic cost functions are introduced in order to make sure that the
assumption of joint diseconomies (defined below) is valid. This play a key role in the
inter-market eﬀects. If we use linear cost functions, the inter-market eﬀects disap-
pear and we expect too see results that are similar to Goyal and Joshi (2003). A link
between two firms with shift the demand curves of both firms to right as a result of
quality improvements. Firms compete in two separate markets but for purposes of
simplicity, quality enhancing collaborations are restricted only to one market. The
cost function is a quadratic function of quantities produced in both markets.
It turns out that stable networks have, what Goyal and Joshi (2003) refer to
as the dominant group architecture. Namely, the firms can be partitioned into two
groups. In the first group, all firms are linked to each other. In the second group,
the firms have no links whatsoever. This is a consequence of increasing returns to
link formation. Namely, the more links a firm has, the greater the benefit of forming
an additional link. With regard to eﬃcient networks, we cannot arrive at a precise
characterization of the networks that will result though we can derive some interesting
properties of such networks and restrict the set of networks that are eﬃcient into a
small class. For four firms or more, eﬃcient networks have only one component and
the geodesic distance between two connected players cannot exceed two. In other
words, dominant group architectures are possible candidates for eﬃcient networks
but we show using examples, that stable and eﬃcient networks need not coincide.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
discusses the notation and terminology. Section 3 discusses the inter-market eﬀects
a la´ Bulow et. al. (1985). Section 4 discusses stable networks. Section 5 discusses
eﬃcient networks. Section 6 concludes. The paper has a lot of tedious algebra most
of which has been relegated to the Appendix.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Multi-market Cournot Model
Suppose there are n firms indexed i = 1, 2, . . . , n (where n > 2) that compete a la´
Cournot in two inter-related markets A and B. Demand in A for firm i is given by
pi = αi − qi −
X
j 6=i
qj. (1)
Demand in B for firm i is given by
Pi = βi −Qi −
X
j 6=i
Qj. (2)
The cost function of the firm i is given by
Ci(qi, Qi) =
1
2
(qi +Qi)2 (3)
and profit of firm i is given by
πi = pi · qi + Pi ·Qi − Ci(qi, Qi). (4)
We begin by giving a rationale of the demand function employed here. Products
here are near substitutes but vertically diﬀerentiated. Diﬀerential quality levels allow
firms to charge diﬀerent prices creating a sub-market within the larger market. This
demand function was introduced by Bowley (1924)1 and used by Spence (1976) and
Dixit (1979). More recently, such demand functions have been employed for instance
by Chakrabarti and Haller (2007) in the context of targeted advertising.
The assumption of joint diseconomies is equivalent to
∂2πi
∂qi∂Qi
< 0. In this model,
it holds because
∂2πi
∂qi∂Qi
= −1. The assumption of strategic substitutes is equivalent
to
∂2πi
∂Qi∂Qj
< 0. In this model, it holds because ∂
2πi
∂Qi∂Qj
= −1.
First consider market 1 in isolation by assuming a priori that Qi = 0 for all i. Let
q∗i , Q∗i and π∗i denote equilibrium quantities and profits in the second stage. Then, it
1Usually, a more general formulation, pi = αi − qi − θ
X
j 6=i
qj where 0 6 θ 6 1 is employed. The
current formulation simplifies the exposition without changing the results.
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is straight forward to show that
π∗i =
3
8
µ(n+ 1)αi −X
j 6=i
αj
n+ 2
¶2
.
Let us consider now the full fledged model. Upon solving the second stage of the
model, we get
q∗i =
1
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
£
(6 + 8n+ 2n2)αi − (3 + 4n+ n2)βi
¤
+
1
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
£
−(5 + 2n)α+ (4 + n)β
¤
;
Q∗i =
1
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
£
(6 + 8n+ 2n2)βi − (3 + 4n+ n2)αi
¤
+
1
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
£
−(5 + 2n)β + (4 + n)α
¤
.
where α =
nP
i=1
αi and β =
nP
i=1
βi. The calculations are in the appendix. The expression
for profit is complicated and given in the appendix.
2.2 Networks
Let the set of players be denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. A network g is a list of pairs
of players who are linked to each other. For simplicity, we denote the link between
i and j (where i 6= j) by ij, so ij ∈ g indicates i and j are linked in the network g.
The links are undirected in the sense that we do not distinguish between ij and ji.
Let gN be the set of all subsets of N of size 2. The network gN is referred to as the
complete network. The set G = {g ⊂ gN} denotes the set of all possible networks on
N . A network in which there are no links is called an empty network and is denoted
by g0.
We let g + ij denote the network formed by adding the link ij to the network
g. g − ij denotes the network formed by deleting the link ij from the network g. A
network payoﬀ function ui : G→ R+ assigns an utility to player i by virtue of being
part of a network. Let u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) denote the vector of utility functions.
Then u combined with N defines a network game.2
2Originally, the term network game was used to denote a transferable utility version of the game
by Jackson (2005).
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A firm i’s neighborhood Ni(g) is given by {j ∈ N\{i}|ij ∈ g} and its cardinality
is given by ηi(g) = |Ni(g)|. ηi(g) is called the degree of player i in network g. We
also define N(g) = ∪i∈NNi(g). N(g) refers to the set of players that have at least one
link. Let η(g) = #N(g) with the convention that if N(g) = ∅, we let η(g) = 1.3
Player i therefore is participating in the links in her link set Li(g) = {ij ∈ g | j ∈
Ni(g)} ⊂ g. Let Li = Li(gN) denote the set of all possible links involving player i.
Let λ(g) = 1
2
P
i∈N
ηi(g) be the total number of links in a network g.
For any h ⊂ g, let g − h denotes the network formed by deleting the link set h
from the network g. Similarly, for h ⊂ gN\g, g + h denotes the network formed by
adding the link set h from the network g.
A network g is regular if each player has the same number of neighbors. Namely,
for all i 6= j, ηi(g) = ηj(g).
A path in g connecting i and j is a set of distinct players {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ⊂ N(g)
with p > 2 such that i1 = i, ip = j, and {i1i2, i2i3, . . . , ip−1ip} ⊂ g. We refer to the
number of links on this path, here p− 1, as the length of the path.
We say i and j are connected to each other if a path exists between them and
they are disconnected otherwise. The number of links on the shortest path between
two distinct players i and j is called the geodesic distance between i and j.
The network g0 ⊂ g is a component of g if N(g0) > 2 and for all i ∈ N(g0) and
j ∈ N(g0), i 6= j, there exists a path in g0 connecting i and j and for any i ∈ N(g0) and
j ∈ N(g), ij ∈ g implies ij ∈ g0. In other words, a component is simply a maximally
connected subnetwork of g. We denote the set of network components of the network
g by C(g). The set of players that are not connected in the network g are collected
in the set of (fully) disconnected players in g denoted by
N0(g) = N \N(g) = {i ∈ N | Ni(g) = ∅}.
Such players are known as singletons. A component g0 ⊂ g is complete if for all
distinct i, j ∈ N(g0), ij ∈ g. A component g0 ⊂ g is regular if for all distinct
i, j ∈ N(g0), ηi(g) = ηj(g). The dominant group architecture gk is characterized by
one complete non-singleton component with k > 2 players and n− k singletons.
3We emphasize here that if N(g) 6= ∅, we have that η(g) > 2. Namely, in those cases the network
has to consist of at least one link.
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A network is a pairwise equilibrium network with regard to a profile of utility
functions u if
(a) for all i and h ⊂ Li (g), ui(g) > ui(g − h), and
(b) for all i and ij /∈ g, if ui(g + ij) > ui(g) then uj(g + ij) < uj(g).
An equivalent definition can be given as follows. Consider a non-cooperative game
where each player i has a strategy set si =
n
{sij}j 6=i
o
with sij ∈ {0, 1}. sij = 1means
i intends to form a link with j, while sij = 0 means i does not intend to form such
a link. A link between two players is formed if and only if sij = sji = 1. A strategy
profile s = {s1, s2, · · · , sn} induces a network g (s) =
( S
i6=j,i∈N,j∈N
ij|sij = sji = 1
)
.
We say that the network g (s) is induced by the strategy profile s. A network g is a
pairwise equilibrium network (or simply and equilibrium network) if
(a) There is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile that induces g;
(b) for all i and ij /∈ g, if ui(g + ij) > ui(g) then uj(g + ij) < uj(g).
For any network g, and h ⊂ gN\g, we denote the marginal benefit of link formation
by
∆ui(g, h) = ui(g + h)− ui(g).
Obviously, for a pairwise equilibrium network, ∆ui(g − h, h) > 0 for all h ⊂ Li (g)
and if ∆ui(g, ij) > 0, then ∆uj(g, ij) < 0.
Next, we define eﬃcient networks. Consider a social welfare function W given by
sums of payoﬀs of all the players. Therefore,
W (g) =
nX
i=1
ui(g).
A network is eﬃcient it is maximizes the social welfare function. More specifically,
g0 is eﬃcient if
W (g0) >W (g)
for all g 6= g0. For any network g, and h ⊂ gN\g, we denote the marginal change in
social welfare as a result of link formation by
∆W (g, h) =W (g + h)−W (g).
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Obviously, for an eﬃcient network, ∆W (g − h, h) > 0 and ∆W (g, h) 6 0.
3 Inter-market Eﬀects
We assume that firms can improve quality via collaborative links in market 1. This
enhances demand. Hence, if a firm has formed k links, then
αi = γ0 + γ · k (5)
It is reasonable to assume that γ0 > γ. For reasons that will be clear later, we assume
γ0 is suﬃciently large compared to γ, namely,
γ0 >
·
(n− 1)2
2
¸
γ. (6)
Link formation costs are given by a real number c where c > 0. To keep the model
tractable, assume that no link formation is possible in the second market. Hence,
assume a two stage game where first stage consists of a link formation game and in
the second stage, Cournot competition ensues. Define
αi(g) = γ0 + γ · ηi(g).
Then, the relevant network network payoﬀ function is given by
ui(g) = π∗i (αi(g))− c · ηi(g)
where π∗i (αi(g)) is derived by expressing optimal profits π∗i in (36) as a function of
αi = αi(g). Let us assume for time being that c = 0.
First consider market 1 in isolation by assuming a priori that Qi = 0 for all i. For
an incomplete network g, if i forms a link with k 6= i (where ik /∈ g), its net profits
increase by
∆ui(g, ik) =
3
4
µ
nγ
(n+ 2)2
¶"
(n+ 1)αi (g)−
X
j 6=i
αj (g) +
nγ
2
#
.
Now, (n+1)αi (g)−
X
j 6=i
αj (g) > (n+1)γ0−(n−1) (γ0 + (n− 1)γ) = 2·γ0−(n−1)2·γ >
0 from (6). Hence, each link unambiguously increases profitability and a complete
network is the unique pairwise stable network. This leads to the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 Let us exogenously impose the condition that Qi = 0 for all i. Then, with
c = 0, the unique pairwise equilibrium network is given by the complete network.
Let us consider now the full fledged model. If i forms a link with k 6= i, its net
profits increase by
∆ui(g, ik) =
·
αi (g) · γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
22n4 + 110n3 + 90n2 − 134n+ 8
¢
−
·
ÃX
j 6=i
αj (g)
!
· γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
22n3 + 102n2 + 66n− 158
¢
−
·
βi · γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
14n4 + 70n3 + 18n2 − 190n− 8
¢
+
·
ÃX
j 6=i
βj
!
· γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
14n3 + 78n2 + 42n− 166
¢
+
·
γ2
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
11n4 + 44n3 − 6n2 − 100n+ 83
¢
. (7)
Clearly, ∆ui(g, ik) is not necessary positive. For instance, consider for all i, n =
6, βi = 400, γ0 = 100, γ = 0.05. Consider an empty network for which αi = γ0. In
such a network, ∆ui(g0, ik) = −0.0894772 making the empty network an equilibrium
network. In a complete network, deleting a link yields a positive payoﬀ of 0.0890931
and hence the complete network is not an equilibrium network. In other words, the
mechanics driving the results of Goyal and Joshi (2003) fail to hold.
We give some intuition behind these results. It follows from strategic complemen-
tarity and joint economies analyzed by Bulow et al. (1985). Note that
dπ∗i
dαi
=
µ
∂π∗i
∂q∗i
¶µ
dq∗i
dαi
¶
+
X
j 6=i
µ
∂π∗i
∂q∗j
¶µdq∗j
dαi
¶
+
µ
∂π∗i
∂Q∗i
¶µ
dQ∗i
dαi
¶
+
X
j 6=i
µ
∂π∗i
∂Q∗j
¶µdQ∗j
dαi
¶
+
µ
∂π∗i
∂αi
¶
. (8)
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Also,
π∗i =
Ã
αi −
nX
k=1
q∗k
!
q∗i +
Ã
βi −
nX
k=1
Q∗k
!
Q∗i −
1
2
(q∗i +Q∗i )2.
Hence, for j 6= i,
∂π∗i
∂q∗j
= −q∗i < 0; (9)
∂π∗i
∂αi
= q∗i > 0; (10)
∂π∗i
∂Q∗j
= −Q∗i < 0. (11)
Also, from first order conditions of profit maximization,
∂π∗i
∂q∗i
= 0; (12)
∂π∗i
∂Q∗i
= 0. (13)
resulting in two terms of (8) dropping out. In Cournot competition, quantity pro-
duced by a firm in equilibrium is decreasing in the demand intercepts of it’s rivals.
Hence, µdq∗j
dαi
¶
< 0. (14)
Further, Bulow et al. (1985) show that
sign
µdQ∗j
dαi
¶
= sign
·µ
∂2πi
∂qi∂Qi
¶
·
µ
∂2πj
∂Qi∂Qj
¶¸
.
Given
µ
∂2πi
∂qi∂Qi
¶
= −1 and
µ
∂2πj
∂Qi∂Qj
¶
= −1 in this multi-market model,4
µdQ∗j
dαi
¶
> 0. (15)
Using inequalities (15), (14), (9), (10) and (11), we can sign each term to get the
following:
dπ∗i
dαi
=
X
j 6=i
µ
∂π∗i
∂q∗j
¶
| {z }
<0
µdq∗j
dαi
¶
| {z }
<0
+
X
j 6=i
µ
∂π∗i
∂Q∗j
¶
| {z }
<0
µdQ∗j
dαi
¶
| {z }
>0
+
µ
∂π∗i
∂αi
¶
| {z }
>0
. (16)
4Note that inequalities (15) and (14) can be verified from (34) and (35).
10
So, the aberrant sign is introduced by the presence of
µ∂Q∗j
∂αi
¶
being positive. If it were
negative, then any increase in αi would only boost profits and a complete network
would result in equilibrium. In fact, the precise expression for
dπ∗i
dαi
is given by
dπ∗i
dαi
= q∗i
µ
1 +
(5 + 2n)(n− 1)
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
¶
−Q∗i
µ
(4 + n)(n− 1)
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
¶
. (17)
Given that an increase in demand in one market no longer unambiguously increases
profit, the result follows.
4 Configuration of Equilibrium Networks
While the payoﬀ functions are quite complicated, this game has features that were
analyzed by Goyal and Joshi (2006). We will devote some space to reproducing their
definitions and terminology. Let us assume c > 0.
Suppose from the network g, we remove player i and all his links, and call the
resulting network g−i. Namely, g−i = g − Li(g). Now, the total number of links in
this network g−i is given by
1
2
P
j 6=i
ηj (g−i) = λ (g−i).
Definition 1 A network game is called playing the field game if the payoﬀ function
of player i is a function of her degree ηi (g) and λ (g−i), namely,
ui (g) = Φ (ηi (g) , λ (g−i))− c · ηi(g).
Definition 2 The payoﬀ function Φ is convex in its own links if the marginal returns
Φ (k + 1, l)− Φ (k, l) is strictly increasing in k.
Definition 3 Suppose l0 > l. The payoﬀ function Φ satisfies the strategic substitutes
property if Φ (k + 1, l0)− Φ (k, l0) < Φ (k + 1, l)− Φ (k, l).
The next lemma is a reproduction of Proposition 3.1 of Goyal and Joshi (2006).
Lemma 2 For a playing the field game, if the payoﬀ function satisfies convexity in
own links and the strategic substitutes property, then a pairwise equilibrium network
always exists. Furthermore, if the payoﬀ function satisfies convexity in own links, the
pairwise equilibrium network is either complete or empty or has the dominant group
architecture.
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In the appendix we show that the network games qualifies as playing the field
game. Furthermore, the payoﬀ function satisfies convexity in own links as well as the
strategic substitutes property. In fact, if we define
∆(k, l) = Φ (k + 1, l)− Φ (k, l) ,
then we show in the appendix that
∂∆
∂k =
2γ2 (11n4 + 44n3 − 6n2 − 100n+ 83)
18 (1 + n)2 (3 + n)2
> 0
and
∂∆
∂l = −
4γ2 (22n3 + 102n2 + 66n− 158)
18 (1 + n)2 (3 + n)2
< 0.
Therefore, applying Lemma 2, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The pairwise equilibrium network exists and is either complete or empty
or has a dominant group architecture.
We note that in the one-market Cournot model, the dominant group architecture
emerges. To see this, one can verify that the one-market Cournot game is also an
example of playing the field game and then apply Lemma 2.
5 Configuration of Eﬃcient Networks
We shall distinguish between three kinds of eﬃciency. First the eﬃcient networks
for firms is one that maximizes the joint profits of firms. This corresponds to the
usual notion of eﬃciency as defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) because firms
are involved in the link formation process. However, one can define two other kinds
of eﬃciency. The eﬃcient networks for consumers are ones that maximize the overall
consumer surplus. Overall eﬃciency refers in our case to networks maximizing the
sum of joint profits and overall consumer surplus. If we just use the words, eﬃcient
networks, we are referring to eﬃcient networks for firms.
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5.1 Eﬃcient Networks for Firms
In this section, we shall discuss eﬃcient networks where the social welfare function
is defined by the sum of profits of all the firms. While we do not obtain an exact
characterization of eﬃcient networks, we can identify certain properties of such net-
works. Let Π : G→ R+ denote the joint profit of firms as a function of the network.
In other words,
Π(g) =
nX
i=1
ui(g).
Consider the eﬀect of link formation between two arbitrary firms i and k in a
network g. In the Appendix we show that such link formation alters the joint profit
of all firms by
∆Π(g, ik) = κ0
"
(αi + αk)−
τ 0
n
ÃX
l 6=i,k
αl
!
+ Λ0
#
− 2c (18)
where τ 0 > 0, κ0 > 0 and Λ0 are constants independent of network structure. τ 0 has
an upper bound less than 11 (at n = 2, its value is 10.791) and is strictly decreasing
in n. It has a lower bound of 2 and converges asymptotically to 2. It is important to
note that at n = 4, τ 0 = 3.5. For the discussion that follows, let us assume n > 3.
Lemma 3 (i) For any network g and player i such that ik, im /∈ g and ηm(g) > ηk(g),
∆Π(g + ik, im) > ∆Π(g, ik).
(ii) If ηm(g) = ηk(g) but n > 4, ∆Π(g + ik, im) > ∆Π(g, ik) as well.
Proof. (i) Starting from an arbitrary network g with ik, im /∈ g suppose two players i
and k form a link. This implies from (18), the increase in social welfare is proportional
to
∆Π(g, ik)
κ0 = 2·γ0+γ·[ηi(g) + ηk(g)]−
τ 0
n
Ã
(n− 2)γ0 + γ
X
l 6=i,k,m
ηl(g) + γ · ηm(g)
!
+Λ0−2
³ c
κ0
´
Then, for forming yet another link say im, the the increase in social welfare is pro-
portional to
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∆Π(g + ik, im)
κ0 = 2 · γ0 + γ · [ηi(g) + ηm(g) + 1]
−τ
0
n
Ã
(n− 2)γ0 + γ
X
l 6=i,k,m
ηl(g) + γ · (ηk(g) + 1)
!
+ Λ0 − 2
³ c
κ0
´
=
∆Π(g, ik)
κ0 + γ
·µ
1− τ
0
n
¶
+
µ
1 +
τ 0
n
¶
(ηm(g)− ηk(g))
¸
=
∆Π(g, ik)
κ0 + γ
·
2 +
µ
1 +
τ 0
n
¶
(ηm(g)− ηk(g)− 1)
¸
Now, if ηm(g) > ηk(g), it implies ηm(g) > ηk(g) + 1. Hence,
∆Π(g + ik, im)
κ0 >
∆Π(g, ik)
κ0 completing the proof.
(ii) Now,
∆Π(g + ik, im)
κ0 =
∆Π(g, ik)
κ0 + γ
·µ
1− τ
0
n
¶¸
.
Since τ 0 = 3.5 for n = 4, τ
0
n < 1. Furthermore, τ
0 and hence
τ 0
n is strictly decreasing
in n, therefore τ
0
n < 1 for all n > 4. Hence, it follows that in all cases,
∆Π(g + ik, im)
κ0 >
∆Π(g, ik)
κ0 .
The following lemma plays a key role in the results that follow.
Lemma 4 For any eﬃcient network for firms g, if ij ∈ g and ik /∈ g, then ηj(g) >
ηk(g). If n > 4, ηj(g) > ηk(g).
Proof. Suppose there exists an eﬃcient network g and ij ∈ g and ik /∈ g. Then,
∆Π(g− ij, ij) > 0. Suppose, towards a contradiction, ηk(g) > ηj(g). This implies by
Lemma 3 that ∆Π(g, ik) > 0 contradicting that g is eﬃcient. Hence, ηk(g) 6 ηj(g).
Next let ηj(g) = ηk(g) and n > 4. Again, ∆Π(g, ik) > ∆Π(g − ij, ij) > 0 which
contradicts that g is eﬃcient. Therefore, ηk(g) < ηj(g).
The proposition below sets forth properties that characterize eﬃcient networks
for firms.
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Proposition 1 If n > 4: (i) The eﬃcient network for firms cannot consist of more
than one component.
(ii) The geodesic distance between any two connected players in an eﬃcient network
for firms is less than or equal to 2.
Proof. (i) Suppose h1, h2 ∈ C(g) where g is an eﬃcient network and ij ∈ h1 and
kl ∈ h2. Now, i is linked to j and not to k which implies using Lemma 4, ηj(g) > ηk(g).
But l is linked to k but not to j which implies ηk(g) > ηj(g). Hence, we arrive at a
contradiction.
(ii) Take two players i and j such that i and j belong to N(h) where h ∈ C(g).
Hence, a path exists between i and j. Suppose the shortest path is {i1i2, i2i3, . . . , ip−1ip}
where i1 = i and ip = j and p > 4. i is linked to i2 but i is not linked to i3. Hence,
from Lemma 4, we get
ηi2(g) > ηi3(g). (19)
Now, i4 is linked to i3 but not linked to i2. Hence,
ηi3(g) > ηi2(g). (20)
But (20) contradicts (19).
5.2 Eﬃcient Networks for Consumers
In this section, we shall discuss eﬃcient networks with regard to consumers. Namely,
these are networks that maximize the consumer surplus. Consider the total consumer
surplus of agents in both markets. It is given by
CS =
X
i
(αi − p∗i ) q∗i +
X
i
(βi − P ∗i )Q∗i
15
where p∗i = αi − q∗ and P ∗i = βi −Q
∗
denotes prices in both markets at equilibrium.
Let Q =
nP
i=1
Qi and q =
nP
i=1
qi. Hence,
CS =
X
i
(αi − p∗i ) q∗i +
X
i
(βi − P ∗i )Q∗i
=
X
i
(q∗) q∗i +
X
i
³
Q∗
´
Q∗i
= (q∗)2 +
³
Q∗
´2
=
·
(n+ 2)α− β
3 + 4n+ n2
¸2
+
·
(n+ 2)β − α
3 + 4n+ n2
¸2
=
(n2 + 4n+ 5)
³
α2 + β2
´
− 4(n+ 2)αβ
(3 + 4n+ n2)2
.
We can express consumer surplus CS as a function of the network. To this end, let
CS : G → R+ denote the overall consumer surplus as a function of the network.
Now, suppose two players i and k form a link in a network g where initially ik /∈ g.
Then, α increases by 2γ and hence,
∆CS(g, ik) = (n
2 + 4n+ 5) (2γ) (2α+ 2γ)− 4(n+ 2)β (2γ)
(3 + 4n+ n2)2
− 2c.
Proposition 2 The eﬃcient network with regard to consumers is either complete or
empty.
Proof. Consider any two arbitrary links ij and kl where neither link belongs to the
network. Now,
∆CS(g + ij, kl)−∆CS(g, ij) = 8γ
2(n2 + 4n+ 5)
(3 + 4n+ n2)2
> 0.
Hence, if ∆CS(g, ij) > 0, then ∆CS(g+ ij, kl) > 0 as well. Hence, starting from any
arbitrary network, if forming one link increases consumer surplus, then forming all
subsequent links enhances welfare as well. Hence, we end up in the complete network.
If on the other hand, link formation costs are suﬃciently high, the empty network is
eﬃcient.
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5.3 Overall Eﬃciency
Overall eﬃcient networks have similar properties to that of networks for firms. Let
us define
W (g) = CS(g) +Π(g) (21)
for all g ∈ G. Suppose two players i and k form a link in a network g where initially
ik /∈ g. Then, let
∆W (g, ik) = ∆CS(g, ik) +∆Π(g, ik). (22)
Lemma 5 (i) For any network g and player i such that ik, im /∈ g and ηm(g) > ηk(g),
∆W (g + ik, im) > ∆W (g, ik).
(ii) If ηm(g) = ηk(g) but n > 4, ∆W (g + ik, im) > ∆W (g, ik) as well.
Proof. (i) From Lemma 3, ∆Π(g + ik, im) > ∆Π(g, ik). From Lemma 2, ∆CS(g +
ik, im) > ∆CS(g, ik). Hence, applying (22), the result follows.
(ii) The result is similar to (i).
The result leads to Lemma 6 which is the analog of Lemma 4.
Lemma 6 For any overall eﬃcient network for firms g, if ij ∈ g and ik /∈ g, then
ηj(g) > ηk(g). If n > 4, ηj(g) > ηk(g).
The proof follows from Lemma 5 in an analogous manner to that of the proof
of Lemma 4 so we skip it to avoid repetition. Now, Lemma 6 directly leads to
Proposition 3 and the proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 1, and so we skip
it to avoid repetition.
Proposition 3 If n > 4: (i) The overall eﬃcient network for firms cannot consist
of more than one component.
(ii) The geodesic distance between any two connected players in an overall eﬃcient
network for firms is less than or equal to 2.
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5.4 Some Examples
Next, for the purposes for illustration, let us consider some examples. By eﬃciency,
we are referring to the traditional notion, namely the eﬃciency of firms.
Example 1 Let n = 3. Then there are eight possible networks, namely complete,
empty, {12}, {13}, {23}, {12, 13}, {12, 23}, {13, 23}. Let βi = 400, γ0 = 100, γ =
0.05, c = 0. From our above lemmas the candidates for stability are complete, empty,
{12}, {13}, {23}, {12, 13, 23} while the candidates for eﬃciency include all networks.
The payoﬀs are summarized in the table below.
Network u1 u2 u3 Π
∅ 9756.94 9756.94 9756.94 29270.83
{12} 9756.92 9756.92 9757.89 29271.70
{13} 9756.92 9757.89 9756.92 29271.70
{23} 9756.92 9756.92 9756.92 29271.70
{12, 13} 9756.90 9757.87 9757.87 29272.60
{12, 23} 9757.87 9756.90 9757.87 29272.60
{13, 23} 9757.87 9757.87 9756.90 29272.60
{12, 13, 23} 9757.85 9757.85 9757.85 29273.60
The unique stable network is the empty network and the unique eﬃcient network is
the complete network.
This example confirms that the sets of stable and eﬃcient networks need not
coincide. Now, let us in Example 1 increase γ from 0.05 to 5. The complete network
remains the eﬃcient network, but now the stable networks are given by {ij}, i, j ∈
{1, 2, 3} and the complete network. We show this in Example 2.
Example 2 Let n = 3. Let βi = 400, γ0 = 100, γ = 5, c = 0. The payoﬀs are
summarized in the table below.
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Network u1 u2 u3 Π
∅ 9756.94 9756.94 9756.94 29270.83
{12} 9758.99 9758.99 9855.29 29373.26
{13} 9758.99 9855.29 9758.99 29373.26
{23} 9855.29 9758.99 9758.99 29373.26
{12, 13} 9769.75 9849.85 9849.85 29469.44
{12, 23} 9849.85 9769.75 9849.85 29469.44
{13, 23} 9849.85 9849.85 9769.75 29469.44
{12, 13, 23} 9853.13 9853.13 9853.13 29559.38
Now, let us in Example 1 further increase γ from 5 to 45. We find that the unique
eﬃcient network is the complete network and the unique stable network is {12}. We
show this in Example 3 below.
Example 3 Let n = 3. Let βi = 400, γ0 = 100, γ = 45. The payoﬀs are summarized
in the table below.
Network u1 u2 u3 Π
∅ 9756.94 9756.94 9756.94 29270.83
{12} 10089.24 10089.24 10889.24 31067.71
{13} 10089.24 10089.24 10089.24 31067.71
{23} 10089.24 10089.24 10089.24 31067.71
{12, 13} 11127.78 10615.28 10615.28 32358.33
{12, 23} 10615.28 11127.78 10615.28 32358.33
{13, 23} 10615.28 10615.28 11127.78 32358.33
{12, 13, 23} 11047.57 11047.57 11047.57 33142.71
The last example (Example 4) shows that the possibility exists that stable and
eﬃcient networks might coincide.
Example 4 Let n = 3. Let βi = 50, γ0 = 100, γ = 40. The payoﬀs are summarized
in the table below.
19
Network u1 u2 u3 Π
∅ 703.13 703.13 703.13 2109.38
{12} 1676.58 1676.58 450.66 3803.82
{13} 1676.58 450.66 1676.58 3803.82
{23} 450.66 1676.58 1676.58 3803.82
{12, 13} 3208.06 945.10 945.10 5098.26
{12, 23} 945.10 3208.06 945.10 5098.26
{13, 23} 945.10 945.10 3208.06 5098.26
{12, 13, 23} 1997.57 1997.57 1997.57 5992.71
The unique stable and eﬃcient network is the complete network.
6 Conclusion
The dynamics of multi-market oligopolies first discussed in Bulow et. al. (1985) can
upset many results which would hold in isolated oligopoly markets. Here we take the
situation of collaborative link formation among Cournot oligopolists with zero link
formation costs. The results that a complete network materializes in equilibrium no
longer holds one we introduces participation of the same set of firms in another not
completely unrelated market. A variety of networks including the empty network can
materialize in equilibrium.
With positive link formation costs, stable networks have a dominant group archi-
tecture. Eﬃcient networks have the interesting feature that they consist of only one
non-empty component and in that component, the geodesic distance between any two
players is two or less. An exact characterization of eﬃcient networks in this example,
or more broadly, in playing the field games in general is an open question, and is
reserved as a future endeavour.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of the Multi-market equilibrium
First substituting (1)-(3) in (4), we get an expression for profits namely,
πi =
Ã
αi − qi −
X
j 6=i
qj
!
· qi +
Ã
βi −Qi −
X
j 6=i
Qj
!
·Qi − 1
2
(qi +Qi)2. (23)
Diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to qi and Qi, we get the first order conditions:
∂πi
∂qi
= 0;
∂πi
∂Qi
= 0.
These result in the following two equations:
αi − 2qi −
X
j 6=i
qj − qi −Qi = 0; (24)
βi − 2Qi −
X
j 6=i
Qj −Qi − qi = 0. (25)
Let Q =
nP
i=1
Qi and q =
nP
i=1
qi. Then, (24) and (25) can be rewritten as
αi − 2qi − q −Qi = 0; (26)
βi − 2Qi −Q− qi = 0. (27)
Summing up (26) over all i, we get
nX
i=1
αi − 2 · q − n · q −Q = 0.
Summing up (27) over all i, we get
nX
i=1
βi − 2 ·Q− n ·Q− q = 0.
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Denoting α =
nP
i=1
αi and β =
nP
i=1
βi, the above two equations can be re-written as:
α− (n+ 2)q −Q = 0; (28)
β − (n+ 2)Q− q = 0. (29)
(28) and (29) constitute a simultaneous equation system of two equations in two
unknowns which can be solved to yield
q∗ = (n+ 2)α− β
3 + 4n+ n2 ; (30)
Q∗ = (n+ 2)β − α
3 + 4n+ n2 . (31)
Substituting (30) and (31) in (26) and (27), we again get a linear system of two
equations in two unknowns, namely,
αi − 2qi −
(n+ 2)α− β
3 + 4n+ n2 −Qi = 0; (32)
βi − 2Qi −
(n+ 2)β − α
3 + 4n+ n2 − qi = 0. (33)
Solving (32) and (33), we get
q∗i =
1
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
£
(6 + 8n+ 2n2)αi − (3 + 4n+ n2)βi
¤
+
1
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
£
−(5 + 2n)α+ (4 + n)β
¤
; (34)
Q∗i =
1
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
£
(6 + 8n+ 2n2)βi − (3 + 4n+ n2)αi
¤
+
1
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
£
−(5 + 2n)β + (4 + n)α
¤
. (35)
Substituting (30), (31), (34), and (35) in (23), we get an expression for profits, namely,
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π∗i =
h
α2i
18(1+n)2(3+n)2
i ¡
8 + 24n+ 107n2 + 66n3 + 11n4
¢
+
h
αi·βi
18(1+n)2(3+n)2
i ¡
16 + 48n− 110n2 − 84n3 − 14n4
¢
+
h
β2i
18(1+n)2(3+n)2
i ¡
8 + 24n+ 107n2 + 66n3 + 11n4
¢
+


αi·
ÃP
j 6=i
αj
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−8− 182n− 124n2 − 22n3
¢
+


βi·
ÃP
j 6=i
αj
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−8 + 142n+ 92n2 + 14n3
¢
+


ÃP
j 6=i
αj
!2
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
83 + 58n+ 11n2
¢
+


αi·
ÃP
j 6=i
βj
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−8 + 142n+ 92n2 + 14n3
¢
+


βi·
ÃP
j 6=i
βj
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−8− 182n− 124n2 − 22n3
¢
+


ÃP
j 6=i
βj
!2
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
83 + 58n+ 11n2
¢
+


ÃP
j 6=i
αj
!ÃP
j 6=i
βj
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−158− 100n− 14n2
¢
(36)
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Hence,
ui(g) =
h
αi(g)2
18(1+n)2(3+n)2
i ¡
8 + 24n+ 107n2 + 66n3 + 11n4
¢
+
h
αi(g)·βi
18(1+n)2(3+n)2
i ¡
16 + 48n− 110n2 − 84n3 − 14n4
¢
+
h
β2i
18(1+n)2(3+n)2
i ¡
8 + 24n+ 107n2 + 66n3 + 11n4
¢
+


αi(g)·
ÃP
j 6=i
αj(g)
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−8− 182n− 124n2 − 22n3
¢
+


βi·
ÃP
j 6=i
αj(g)
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−8 + 142n+ 92n2 + 14n3
¢
+


ÃP
j 6=i
αj(g)
!2
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
83 + 58n+ 11n2
¢
+


αi(g)·
ÃP
j 6=i
βj
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−8 + 142n+ 92n2 + 14n3
¢
+


βi·
ÃP
j 6=i
βj
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−8− 182n− 124n2 − 22n3
¢
+


ÃP
j 6=i
βj
!2
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
83 + 58n+ 11n2
¢
+


ÃP
j 6=i
αj(g)
!ÃP
j 6=i
βj
!
18(1+n)2(3+n)2


¡
−158− 100n− 14n2
¢
−c · ηi(g). (37)
7.2 Pairwise Equilibrium Networks
First, we will show that the network game is playing the field game. There are
two arguments in the payoﬀ function. The first one is αi (g) and the second one is
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X
j 6=i
αj (g). First,
αi (g) = γ0 + γ · ηi (g) .
Second, X
j 6=i
αj (g) = (n− 1) γ0 + γ
X
j 6=i
ηj (g) .
Consider the links of player j 6= i in network g given by Nj (g). One can divide this
set into two subsets. First, the links with player i, given by say N ij (g) which is either
ij or ∅. The second is the links with players other than i, given by N−ij (g). Let the
respective cardinalities be given by ηij (g) and η−ij (g). Therefore,X
j 6=i
ηj (g) =
X
j 6=i
ηij (g) +
X
j 6=i
η−ij (g)
= ηi (g) + 2 · λ (g−i) .
Hence,
ui (g) = Φ (ηi (g) , λ (g−i))− c · ηi(g).
The rest of the derivation is an exercise in tedious algebra. Let us define a set of
positive parameters.
ν = 18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2;
ρ1 = (8 + 24n+ 107n2 + 66n3 + 11n4) ;
ρ2 = (−16− 48n+ 110n2 + 84n3 + 14n4) ;
ρ3 = (8 + 182n+ 124n2 + 22n3) ;
ρ4 = (−8 + 142n+ 92n2 + 14n3) ;
ρ5 = (83 + 58n+ 11n2) ;
ρ6 = (158 + 100n+ 14n2) .
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Then,
Φ (k, l) = 1ν
£
ρ1 (γ0 + γ · k)2 − ρ2 · βi (γ0 + γ · k)
¤
−1ν [ρ3 (γ0 + γ · k) ((n− 1) γ0 + γ · k + 2 · γ · l)] (38)
+
1
ν [βi · ρ4 ((n− 1) γ0 + γ · k + 2 · γ · l)]
+
1
ν
£
ρ5 ((n− 1) γ0 + γ · k + 2 · γ · l)2
¤
+
1
ν
"
ρ4
ÃX
j 6=i
βj
!
(γ0 + γ · k)
#
−1ν
"
ρ6
ÃX
j 6=i
βj
!
((n− 1) γ0 + γ · k + 2 · γ · l)
#
+C
where C is a collection of term unrelated to k or l and hence can be treated as a
constant.
Therefore,
∆(k, l) = Φ (k + 1, l)− Φ (k, l)
=
1
ν
£
ρ1
¡
2γ0 · γ + γ2 (2k + 1)
¢¤
−
µ
1
ν
¶
γ · ρ2 · βi +
µ
1
ν
¶
γ · ρ4 · βi +
µ
1
ν
¶
γ · ρ4
ÃX
j 6=i
βj
!
+
1
ν [ρ5 · γ (2 (n− 1) γ0 + γ (2k + 1) + 4 · γ · l)]
−1ν
£
ρ3
¡
γ0 · γ · n+ γ2 (2k + 2l + 1)
¢¤
−1ν
"ÃX
j 6=i
βj
!
ρ6 · γ
#
.
Hence,
∂∆
∂k =
µ
2γ2
ν
¶
(ρ1 − ρ3 + ρ5)
=
µ
2γ2
ν
¶¡
11n4 + 44n3 − 6n2 − 100n+ 83
¢
> 0.
26
Finally,
∂∆
∂l = 2
µ
γ2
ν
¶
(2ρ5 − ρ3)
= −2
µ
γ2
ν
¶¡
22n3 + 102n2 + 66n− 158
¢
< 0.
7.3 Eﬃcient Networks for Firms
Consider the eﬀect of link formation between two arbitrary firms i and k on firm
l 6= k, i. The change in profits is given by
∆π∗l = −
·
αl · γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
44n3 + 248n2 + 364n+ 16
¢
+
·
ÃX
m6=l
αm
!
· γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
44n2 + 232n+ 332
¢
+
·
βl · γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
28n3 + 184n2 + 284n− 16
¢
−
·
ÃX
m6=l
βm
!
· γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
28n2 + 200n+ 316
¢
+
·
γ2
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
44n2 + 232n+ 332
¢
. (39)
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Further, from (7), the change in profits of k gross of link formation costs are given
by:
∆π∗k =
·
αk · γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
22n4 + 110n3 + 90n2 − 134n+ 8
¢
−
·
ÃX
j 6=k
αj
!
· γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
22n3 + 102n2 + 66n− 158
¢
−
·
βk · γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
14n4 + 70n3 + 18n2 − 190n− 8
¢
+
·
ÃX
j 6=k
βj
!
· γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
14n3 + 78n2 + 42n− 166
¢
+
·
γ2
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
11n4 + 44n3 − 6n2 − 100n+ 83
¢
. (40)
Hence,
∆Π(g, ik) = ∆π∗i +∆π∗k +
X
l 6=i,k
∆π∗l − 2c
=
·
(αi + αk) · γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
22n4 + 132n3 + 132n2 − 332n− 498
¢
−
·
ÃX
l 6=i,k
αl
!
· γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
44n3 + 352n2 + 860n+ 696
¢
_
·
(βi + βk) · γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
14n4 + 84n3 + 84n2 − 316n− 474
¢
+
·
ÃX
l 6=i,k
βl
!
· γ
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
28n3 + 224n2 + 652n+ 600
¢
+
·
γ2
18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2
¸ ¡
22n4 + 132n3 + 132n2 − 332n− 498
¢
−2c (41)
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Note that we can simplify (41) into
∆Π(g, ik) = κ0
"
(αi + αk)−
1
n
ÃX
l 6=i,k
αl
!
(44n3 + 352n2 + 860n+ 696)¡
22n3 + 132n2 + 132n− 332− 498n
¢ + Λ0#− 2c
= κ0
"
(αi + αk)−
τ 0
n
ÃX
l 6=i,k
αl
!
+ Λ0
#
− 2c (42)
where τ 0 > 0, κ0 > 0 and Λ0 are constants independent of network structure. τ 0 has
an upper bound less than 11 (at n = 2, its value is 10.791) and is strictly decreasing
in n. It has a lower bound of 2 and converges asymptotically to 2. It is important to
note that at n = 4, τ 0 = 3.5.
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